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IDEALS OF A LAWYER*
The subject which I have selected to discuss in the time
which your dean has allotted to me, carries with it a very serious responsibility both to the speaker and the audience. I look
into the faces of young men and women, I imagine, from all
parts of the state, who will, in ten or fifteen years, or even less,
bear upon their shoulders the administration of the law in all
parts of this Commonwealth. I see before me not only the future
practitioners of the state, but those who, from the bench, will
pronounce, as if ex cathedra, the ultimate interpretation not
only of the written law of the Commonwealth, but of those principles of morality which lie at the basis of all law which God
has written in the hearts of every one of us who cares for ultimate justice not only between man and man, but between man
and that aggregation of citizens which we call the state.. Look
into your hearts and you will find various motives which have
prompted you to select the law as your profession. Unfortunately too many of us look to the law as a mere means for the
accumulation of a fortune to be expended upon our pleasure,
whether that pleasure comes from carnal ambition, from display, or from the mere love of money. If you have made your
selection of a profession with this end in view, the sooner you
repent and seek some other object for your lives, the better
it will be for you. While some lawyers by thrift and economy
have managed to accumulate respectable fortunes, they are the
exception and not the rule.
It cannot be doubted that numerous other occupations and
professions afford more efficient means for the mere accumulation of money than does the law. Mechanical, manufacturing
and mercantile pursuits hold out to the mere money-grabber
vastly greater opportunities for -the accumulation of wealth
*An address delivered March 11, 1925, before the students of the
University of Kentucky College of Law. It represents the ideals of
the speaker whose untimely death on September 17, 1925, was an irre-

parable loss to the bar of the state.-Ed.
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than do the so-called honorable professions. The ministry, the
practice of law, journalism, medicine, and other so-called learned
professions, make an appeal to you and me, not as moneymakers, but as a means, which if carried out with high ideals,
tend to develop that spirituality of life which is the true end
and aim of all of us who have anything like a wide outlook upon
life. On the other hand I wish to say, and if this should be your
guiding star in the practice of your profession, that the opportunities which you will have for the moral and spiritual uplift
of the ctizens of this state, are not less than those which pertain
to the ministry of the gospel.
I shall assume, although I realize that it is by no means
true, that all of you have chosen your profession with the ideal
that you are priests for the administration of God's justice
among men. This assumption puts it up to you to search your
own consciences and see what principles are elementary in
your profession, because these principles are what is known as
the ethics of the law. I regret very much to say that in the
years which have elapsed since I have begun the practice of law,
there has been a vast change in the ideals which measure the
conduct of lawyers in their dealings with their clients, with
their fellow lawyers and with the courts. Certain principles,
to which I shall presently advert, which were regarded, within
my memory, as elementary, have gradually changed in their
apparent obligation and I think we no longer measure our obligations by the same standards which were in vogue forty or
fifty years ago. For this reason and because I think the change
has been a distinct deterioration, I want to make an appeal to
you to 9tand firmly for the landmarks of the moral and ethical
conduct of our profession, which will make for better men without making you less efficient lawyers.
Under the influence of the American Bar Association certain canons of professional conduct have been crystallized which
show a disposition to return to the ancient landmarks of professional ethics without, I regret to say, any very serious discussion of the underlying principles from which these canons
have been formulated, and so, while I rejoice that the Bar Associations sbem to have turned their faces once more towards the
law as an honorable profession, the canons formulated have not
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altogether met the approval of even those lawyers who aspire
to high ideals in the practice of law. Christianity is a part of
the common law of England and no formulation of the principles of Christianity has ever approximated in depth and
width the principles enunciated by our Savior when he uttered
to his apostles the Sermon on the Mount.
There is in the oath of office administered to the lawyers
in some of the newer states, a perfectly ideal formulation of the
duty of an attorney to his God, to his state and to his fellowmen. How far a lawyer may go in supporting the cause of his
client may be formulated in a negative way, by saying that you
do not owe to your client the duty of doing for him anything
which a man, who is a Christian and a gentleman, might not
do for himself. We often hear a lawyer justify a shady transaction by quoting from some of the older crooks the supposititious principle that a man is justified in doing for his client
things whch he would never think admissible, or would never
attempt to justify in the forum of his conscience in his own
behalf. The infamous sophism that law is "anything that may
be confidently asserted and plausibly maintained" is the cornerstone of a structure which has its foundation in the swamp
and not on a rock. When we bear in mind that we are God's
ministers for the advancement of the square deal between man
and man, by that same token we eliminate the idea that a lawyer may do for his client what he would not do for himself.
I have said that if your purpose in life is merely to accumulate
a fortune, you are on the wrong track. Lawyers with no
higher ideals than that were formerly called "mercenary" lawyers; using the word "mercenary" in its lower and more restricted sense as meaning a lawyer who is out for the stuff. The
expression was crystallized by a statute, 20th Charles I, which
may be found in 1st Hening's Law of Virginia, at page 302,
from which I read:

" hereas many troublesome suits are multiplied by the unskill-

fullness and covetousness of attorneys, who have more intended their
own profit and their inordinate lucre than the good and benefit of their
clients: Be it therefore enacted, That all mercenary attorneys be wholly
expelled from such office, except such suits as they have already undertaken, and are now depending, and in case any person or persons shall
offend contrary to this act to be fined at the discretion of the court."
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If that law had remained in force in Virginia, I imagine
most of us would have found ourselves in other walks of life
where we could have earned a livelihood for ourselves and our
families. It shows the esteem held by our "ancient and honorable profession" by the Parliament during the time of the
Stuarts. The assembly of Virginia in 1642-3 passed an act
regulating licensing of attorneys and expressly providing that
no attorney should plead in any county court, or demand or
receive either for drawing a petition, declaration or answer
and for his fee in pleading the cause of his client, anything
above the quantity of twenty pounds of tobacco, or in the
quarter court above the amount of fifty pounds of tobacco, and
providing as a penalty that any lawyer who should transgress
against the premises, or should take above these amounts, should
forfeit five hundred pounds of tobacco in the county court and
in the quarter court two thousand pounds of tobacco. And it
was further provided in the same act that no attorney licensed
as aforesaid, might refuse to be "entertayned" in any cause,
unless he had been "entertayned" by the client on the other
side. I pause to give you an opportunity to reflect how entertaining you would think it would be to have your fee in the
county court restricted to fifty pounds of tobacco in a case
which might represent untold principles and enormous values.
How entertaining would you think it was to try a cause in the
circuit court for which you could get a sack of tobacco which
you could carry away at the close of the day swung over your
shoulder? The act I have quoted in 20th Charles I, in 1st
iFening's Virginia Statutes, 275, shows, I think, that even the
restricted fees payable in tobacco, to which I have referred,
were of such character as to have awakened public displeasure
to such an extent that "mercenary" lawyers were kicked out of
the profession by the act, to which I have referred. Fortunately, the prejudice existing in the middle part of the 17th century long ago passed away and the profession of the law has
opened up to the ambitious young men and women, a means
by which they can not only maintain a competence, in the practice, but may hold a position of influence, political or civic,
which has made them leaders of public thought in the community where they have cast their lot. It has been said a good
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lawyer lives well and dies poor, but I may add that in the
books where his final account is cast, he may, if he keeps true
to the ideals of his profession, have innumerable credits which
make for the treasures hereafter which neither moth nor rust
corrupt nor thieves break through and steal.
I have referred to the oath of lawyers upon entering their
profession. This oath means little or nothing in Kentucky.
You will bind yourself to support the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky; and that you have not fought a duel, or helped anybody to fight a duel or aided or assisted anybody to fight a duel,
so help you God; and further that you will demean yourself
as an attorney at law to the best of your ability; but this, I submit, leaves you to try yourself in the forum of your own conscience without any formula by which you may determine what
your duty as attorney at law may mean. For this reason, I am
going to tell you what I understand your duty to your God,
your country and yourself is, by taking the oath of office as attorney at law. This demeaning yourself as attorney at law is
susceptible of analysis and has been defined as follows:
"I Do SOLEmLY SwEAR:

I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of ...........................................................
I will maintain the respect due to Courts of Justice and judicial
officers;
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall
appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to
be honestly debatable under the law of the land;
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the cause confided
to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and
will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
I will -maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets
of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with his
business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged;
I will never reject from any consideration personal to myself the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for
lucre or malice. SO HELP ME GOD."

You will notice from the reading of this oath of office that
it assumes at the start that an applicant has complied with the
conditions prescribed by law touching his knowledge of the law
and his ability to practice the same. The moral character and
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good standing in the community of an individual who offers
himself to take this oath is assumed to have been complied with
and that the lawyer offering to take the oath of office has satisfied the examining board that he is a person of good moral
standing. I suggest that there is a defect necessary perhaps,
in this, that there is nothing in the conditions touching a lawyer's application for an examination to practice law and the
oath of office itself, which requires that he should have that
high sense of propriety which should mark the members of
our profession. There is nothing in either the application or
the oath of office which assumes that the lawyer has that high
sense of propriety which is the foundation of all legal attainment, that sense of sympathy, of kindness, of gentility which
marks the dealing of a high class gentleman with his fellowmen and which is wholly unprovided for even in the Decalogue.
However, I am giving the Decalogue too restricted an interpretation. Our Savior said in interpreting this Decalogue that
the whole of the law and the prophets was summed up in the
Golden Rule. However, it is not my purpose to preach, but to
see if I can find in this short time some fundamental roots out of
which the ethics of the law may spring as a beautiful tree,
shapely and fruitful.
The principle has been recognized by the Court of Appeals. Indeed I presume it is written in the conscience of every
man whose conduct adorns our profession, that if you or I in the
course of our practice should cease to have that high moral
character, which is a condition precedent to our obtaining a
license, and that fact should be shown to a court of competent
jurisdiction, the right to practice law could be revoked upon the
broad general principle that the condition of a moral standing in
the community is a continuing. condition, and that when the condition ceases to exist, the right which was founded on it, ceases
also.
In Lenihan v. Commonwealthl two principles are recognized by the Appellate Court; one was that a practicing lawyer
may not be guilty of a fraud in procuring practice, and the
second was that the court in punishing a misdoer in the practice
of the law, having an unlimited discretion between reprieve and
1165 Ky. 93.
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disbarment, should use the least degree of punishment which
might accomplish the reformation of the offender. In that case
it appeared from the record that a practicing lawyer had a prospective client who had been injured by an accident warranting a tort action. The victim of the accident was a minor. The
lawyer took the prospective client to his office, knowing that
the relatives of his client were engaged in attempting to secure
a settlement without the expense of a lawsuit. He concealed
that fact from the client and told him that his parents could not
qualify as his guardians. He selected for him a guardian who
would be subservient to the lawyer's interests and had him
qualify for the purpose of bringing the action. He made a contract for a large contingent fee and the question arose whether
the conduct thus shown warranted a disbarment. Judge William H. Fields, who has always stood like a stone wall against
the improprieties of our profession, disbarred the guilty lawyer
and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. The judgment of
disbarment was reversed, not because the lawyer was not guilty,
but because a less punishment than the forfeiture of his profession might have saved him without injury to the public.
In the case of C7reste v. Louisville Railway Company,2 it
appeared that Chreste, having procured a contract of employment by solicitation on the part of his agent, prosecuted an
action for damages against the Louisville Railway Company in
behalf of one who had been injured by it. Without stating
in detail the facts of the case, the question involved upon appeal
by Chreste from the judgment refusing to enforce the claim
upon the contract thus made, the Appellate Court stated the
question in this language: "Is a contract between a lawyer
and his client obtained by solicitation on the part of the lawyer valid, or is it contrary to public policy and, therefore, void V"
There was no fraud employed by Chreste's agent and the bare
question presented to the court was whether solicitation of business invalidated a contract obtained thereby. Let me remark
in passing that it was one of the cornerstones of the law regulating the duty of an attorney in-the obtainment of business
to abstain from any solicitation of business or any means resorted to, to procure clients by request or by any approach to
2167 Ky. 75.
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them for that purpose. The court recognized this principle,
but held that Chreste's contract might be enforced by him.
The court concluded as follows:
"Considering the difficulty of fixing the dividing line between what
is proper .and improper solicitation, the uncertainty that the doctrine
would introduce into all contracts between attorneys and their clients,
the fact that solicitation is not condemned at common law or denounced
by our Constitution or Statutes, and the further fact that it Is difficult
to perceive upon what theory it can be said to be clearly injurious to
the public good, we conclude that mere solicitation on the part of an
attorney, unaccompanied by fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence
or imposition of some kind, or other circumstances sufficient to invalidate the contract, is not of itself sufficient to render a contract between
an attorney and client void on the ground that it is contrary to public
policy. It follows that the second paragraph of defendant's answer presented no defense and that the demurrer thereto was improperly overruled."

I do not think that the position of the court was unsound,
but I will say to you it emphasizes the importance of recognizing, at all times, the line of demarcation between that which
is proper and that which is lawful.
Quite recently the learned judge who decided the Lenihan
case and also the Chreste case, had before him an application
to disbar a lawyer under circumstances of such an unusual
character as warrant my calling your attention to it, although,
as the case is still pending in the Court of Appeals, it would
be manifestly improper for me to comment on the ruling of the
learned judge who decided the case below. A very prominent
lawyer, who occupied numerous places of eminence and distinction in the state, was president of an incorporated collection
company. This business seems to have been quite extensive.
Very large sums of money were collected for clients by the company, of which this lawyer was president, and the charge was
made that money was retained by the company without payment
to its patrons for months, in some instances, perhaps for years.
The attorney pleaded not guilty upon the rule against him
for contempt and urged upon the court, through his attorney, that he had no personal knowledge of the facts charged
against him, that his business was so extensive as to preclude personal attention to the collections and disbursements.
The court refused to disbar him but suspended him from the
practice for a period of one year. The defendant thereupon
appealed to the Court of Appeals where his appeal now stands
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undetermined. As I said, it would be manifestly improper for
me to comment upon the propriety of this suspension from practice. I have called your attention to the case, however, for
quite another reason. It is this: as long as the practice of law
is sanctified by the certificate of g~od moral character, an examination at the hands of a board composed of gentlemen
learned in the law and the taking of an oath of office which
appeals to God for the integrity of one's motive and conduct,
the law should not sanction the organization of a corporation,
whose purpose is to collect from recalcitrant debtors through
the instrumentality of the law, at the hands of a corporation
which cannot recognize the sanctity of an oath, or appeal to
God to damn it, should it fail to do its duty.
The practice of law is an individual responsibility and cannot, I submit, be divided up into aliquot parts and each stockholder shoulder responsibilities in proportion to his holdngs
of stock and take credit for doing his duty measured by the
dividends the directors may see proper to declare.
However, to get back to our theme: in periods varying according to the length of your study here, those whom I see before me will go out into the business world charged with the
most responsible duty, second perhaps to preaching the gospel,
of any of our learned professions. Indeed I cannot refrain from
telling a story which happened under my own observation, to
illustrate this. An old lawyer of my acquaintance who once
lived in Lebanon, Kentucky, who had practiced law until he
had attained the three-score years and ten and more, called my
attention once to the fact that for several weeks the newspapers had been lurid with the acts of immorality which had
been committed by members of the ministry and he was led
to comment on it in substantially this language: "Notwithstanding the fact," he said, "that we see in the papers so many
accounts of immorality on the part of the ministerial profession, I do not believe that they are worse as a class than the
lawyers. We see more glaring instances of immorality imputed to the ministers than to the lawyers, because their opportunities are wider." I wish to say that this was in all seriousness and not intended as humor at all. The question then presents itself, how are you going to put yourself in touch with
the people who shall insist upon enforcing their rights and are
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willing to pay money for it? You cannot solicit business without violating the first canon of professional ethics. It is laid
down in the very horn-books of our profession that it is our
duty to stand aloof and let the world discover our talents without undue effort on our part to exploit ourselves by advertisement, by solicitation, by devices of any kind to make manifest
to the world what astonishingly good lawyers we are. It is
wholly improper for us to proclaim to the world that we can,
like Mr. Bungle's golf ball, both shine in the dark and proclaim
our merits in articulate speech. Like the sex which we adore
and worship and which, theoretically at any rate, had to stand
mute until sought out and solicited in marriage, we must keep
our mouths shut and not let it be known that "Barkiss is willing." We cannot, if you please, imitate our sisters in attempting to learn the art of vamping. We have not even one year
in four when the bridle is taken off and we can display our
willingness to be hired for a reasonable fee.
The illegal methods of getting business by lawyers are
numerous and conspicuous. I have heard it said that in our
larger cities it is a practice, by those desiring to bring suits
against the public service corporations, for damages from any'thing from mashing a nail to losing one's life, to hire touters
to go into the public places to tell the unfortunate victims of
railroad accidents, what a great lawyer A, or B, or 0 is, and
how he will get the best results for you if you employ him as
your attorney. I have even heard that in some of the more
wicked cities, where the railroads and other public corporations
are represented by unscrupulous lawyers, it is not unusual to
send touters from their offices to solicit employment for the
very purpose of betraying their clients, seeing that they do not
get large verdicts in the court. These are the grosser forms
of professional impropriety, which the conscience of every lawyer who has intellect enough to go through the law-school, knows
as improper without anybody telling him.
I have known lawyers to adopt this method of self-exploitation. When he would meet his brother attorney in a public place he would in a quite audible tone of voice introduce
to him the subject of law and say: "I had this question of law
which came up in my practice today. Of course, I cannot
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call names," but he will state in an audible tone of voice, so
that the entire audience may hear him, his case for the benefit
of some select litigant who he happens to know has a kindred
case pending or about to be brought. I shall have something
further to say about the duty of the attorney not even to
think about his client's case in the presence of a mind-reader,
before I shall conclude what I have to say to you this morning. For the present, I pass on to other methods which need
no discussion as to the unethical character of the practice.
I have known lawyers of the more unscrupulous class, to
familiarize themselves with the dockets of the courts and utilize
the information obtained from the dockets to let the defendants in the various cases know in a quite inconspicuous way
what success they had had in that particular character of case,
the moral being, of course, that what they had done once they
could do again.
Every lawsuit is a drama ranging all the way from broad
farce to deepest tragedy, and most cases of importance, at least,
are represented by two or more lawyers upon each side. It is
a well recognized fact, though often ignored, that there is one
lawyer upon each side ordinarily to whom the client and the
lawyer's associates look as the leader of any given case. He
lays out the lines of the battle and he sends the forces to that
part of the field which need re-enforcing and he it is who
manages the technique of the case. To him the utmost allegiance
is owed and cases are sometimes lost by an effort on the part
of junior counsel to exploit themselves. I am reminded in this
connection of Hamlet's advice to the players:
"And let those that play your clowns speak no more than Is set
down for them; for there be of them, that will themselves laugh, to set
on some quality of barren spectators to laugh too; though in the meantime some necessary question of the play be then to be considered;
that's villainous, and shows a most pitiful ambition In the fool that
uses It."

Of course, it is the duty of every lawyer to give full cooperation to his leader in winning the case by suggestion of
anything of importance that occurs to him, but a lawyer who
exploits himself by making witty remarks in the presence of
the jury and the court, needs a poker instead of a fee. But
you may as k me if I cannot advertise myself, if I cannot brag
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upon my talents, how may I attract the attention of the litigating public? How are they ever to know that it would be
wise to employ me? I will say this: get the best office you can
in the best place; fit it up in the best style that you can; buy
all the books your money or credit will reach; stay in your office
diligently, from reasonably early in the morning until reasonably late in the evening, mastering the principles of law
laid down by elementary writers and preparing yourself to be
ready for a touch-and-go when the client comes.
They tell a story of Daniel Webster, that when he was in
the callow youth of his practice a friend, who recognized him as
a man of promise and who happened to be an officer of a great
insurance company, had a litigation in which he wished to give
Mr. Webster an opportunity. He employed him upon an
agreed fee. Webster put the fee in his pocket, went to the public library in Boston and spent days in unremitting labor upon
the principles touching that particular case. He tried out the
case and won it, and when he came to figure up the profit and
loss in the case he found that he had paid out more than the
insurance company had paid him. Years passed and he attained
the maturity of his learning and practice, and lo, another case
came to him of the same character, where he could charge a
well-nigh unlimited fee, and he went into it prepared from
his former employment and again won the case, but this time,
I may say, the balance was in his favor.
You won't be lonesome in your office if you love your profession and if you study intelligently the decisions of the great
judges who have written their individuality in the books of reports. The acquisition of a knowledge of the law is far more advantageous than a cross-word puzzle, or a game of chess, or
checkers, or even mah jong, and infinitely more profitable.
You will find when the evening comes your trousers may be a
little smoother, but if you have the courage which lies back
of every profession, stick to it and as God lives you will make
a success of it. If you are a better lawyer than the other lawyers in the place where you may locate, the world will make
a beaten track to your office as much as they would to the
workshop of the man who makes a better rat-trap than anybody
else. You will not go into the practice of law without having
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numerous friends who sometimes have litigation and who will
speak a word for you in season, without any prompting on
your part, and when your time comes, the best advertisement
may be found in the court-room where you can exploit the
knowledge you have acquired in the quiet days of early inaction.
I am taking too much time, however, discussing this subject
of professional ethics in a general way. I have called your attention to the interest taken by the Bar Association in urging
upon the members of our profession a return to the old principles which obtained when our grandfathers entered the profession. I think perhaps it may be of use to you if I formulate
some of the canons laid down by the American Bar Association,
not following them slavishly, but submitting to you principles
for your mature search and consideration and sometimes even
criticizing the soundness of the rules laid down by them. I
shall criticize, where I criticize at all, with great reluctance,
but with the knowledge that in many instances these canons
have been adopted by a majority vote and in some instances
against the sound judgment of members of the profession whom
I hold in the highest respect. I may remark in passing that
your duty to yourself is to determine all questions for yourself, not departing from the landmarks of professional ethics
without reasons which seem just to yourself. In this matter, as
in every other, I beg you to remember that you have no right
to put a strait-jacket on your soul any more than you have
a right to let anybody else do it for you. Lay out your rules
of conduct in the form of your own conscience and repeal the
canons I am offering for your suggestion, permanently or ten porarily, as your relation to your God, your state and yourself
may in each instance require.
In taking up these canons of professional ethics as adopted
by the Bar Association as a backbone, I suggest that you will
find that they deal (1) with the relation between the lawyers
and the public before the relation of client and lawyer is entered into between any one of you; (2) after your employment
as attorney, the relationship of lawyer to client may b'e dealt
with with certain canons more or less obvious, but which always
need a statement either as a principle by which you are to be
guided, or as a principle from which you may depart; (3) the
relation between the lawyer and the courts, and conversely
L. J.-2
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between the courts and the lawyer constitutes a subject-matter
for your earnest consideration; (4) the relationship of lawyer to his associates and to his adversary must also be considered.
You will find that all of thdse canons fit in, except a few
which are more or less empirical, with the broad general principle
that a lawyer when he enters upon his profession carries with
him as the elementary doctrines of morality, of fair dealing in
his relationship to his fellowmen, those principles which control
us at all times in our conduct as gentlemen, who always recognize the fact that the law requires us to do nothing immoral, improper, unjust or unfair to our fellowman. Your first relationship is the relationship of frankness with your God, and no client
has the right to ask of the lawyer that he do anything which in
the forum of his conscience seems to be immoral, improper or
unjust. Taking up these subjects in their consecutive order,
you will find these canons well recognized:
(1) A lawyer may not advertise himself, either in the public prints or by letterhead or otherwise beyond the simple legal
card with the place where his office may be found.
(2) When a client comes into your office for the purpose
of securing your services either as counselor or as advocate, it is
your duty to cross-examine him as tactfully as you may, but
nevertheless fully to get the facts as he understands them with a
view t6, determining for yourself whether he has taken counsel
with his own interests or with that sense of justice which should
underlie all litigaton. Remember, however, to give him the benoefit of the doubt where his case is fairly stated, if the facts and
law are fairly debatable. Be perfectly frank with him as to the
merits of his case. If you think his case is not maintainable, tell
him so. You may temporarily lose a client, but in the long run
you will gain a friend, which is far more valuable.
(3) When you have satisfied yourself that your client
needs assistance of legal character, the next thing is to make
a satisfactory adjustment with him for your compensation. He
has already taken some of your time; he has already precluded
you from taking employment on the other side and common justice requires that he should compensate you for the legal opinion you have given him, although in the early years of your practice, the compensation which you exact from a prospective client,
if measured by the value of your services, will not be great. I
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speak from experience, because I think I may say with frankness to you, not to be repeated where my clients could hear it,
that when I entered the profession I could not have prepared a
petition upon a plain note of hand without copying it from the
book.
(4) When this preliminary has been satisfactorily arranged
the principles of professional ethics have placed a seal upon your
lips which absolutely precludes you from telling anything which
your client has told you, or even from thinking about it in the
presence of a mind-reader. Do not flatter yourself that you can
talk about your client's case outside anonymously. Lawyers are
not as a rule dull, and when you undertake to talk about somebody's case in the abstract, you are in all probability laying your
cards on the table before him and you are -violating this canon
of legal ethics.
(5) It is your duty to your client to make a diligent and
careful examination of the lawbooks to see how far your opinion
is borne out by the authorities; to trim your opinion to fit the
well recognized rules of law and to shape his case as far, in
equity and in good conscience, you can bring him within those
principles.
(6) And this brings me to this canon of professional ethics.
Your relation to your lawsuit calls for the fairest dealings with
your associate counsel, if there is one, your adversary as there is
certain to be, and the judges who preside over the courts where
your case is to be tried.
(7) You have no authority by a general employment to
make any agreement, without the consent of your client, with
opposing counsel, except such as touches merely the practice of
the case. These agreements should be entered into with opposing counsel with the greatest care and where possible they should
be written and signed or embraced as an order of the court.
(8) Offensive personalities at the expense of your adversary, or his attorneys, should not be indulged in. I have known,
however, the severest punishment to be meted out justly where
counsel had made themselves liable to punishment for breaking
this canon. I think this will justify an illustration.
I saw a will case tried once, quite a celebrated cause in its
day, involving the estate of some hundreds of thousands of dol-
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lars, in which the attack was made upon the testator's testamentary capacty upon the ground that a partial paralysis, the
effects of which had lasted for some years, had rendered him incapable of recognizing his obligation to the natural objects of
his bounty. The testator in his lifetime and for some years before his death had been attended by a physician whose practice
was somewhat irregular, but which, on the whole, had resulted
in great relief to the bed-ridden patient. This physician, whom
I shall call Dr. A, was one of the leading witnesses for the establishment of the will. Numerous counsel were engaged upon both
sides, and the case was tried in Stanford, where leading members
of the profession at that time were T. P. Hill, W. G. Welch and
Mike Saufley. The leading attorney on the other side for the
establishment of the will was an uncle of T. P. Hill, whom I
have mentioned. You know, of course, that the propounder of
the will has the last argument before the jury, and this duty
was put upon the uncle of T. P. Hill. All through the trial
counsel for the contestants had rung in the charge that Dr. A
was a "quack," so that the word "quack" had become a slogan
for the contestants. When the last argument for the propounders came to be delivered, it was made by one of the most skillful
advocates it has ever been my fortune to hear. When he came to
answer the argument of "quackery" against Dr. A he said substantially this:
"Gentlemen of the Jury, against all of the testimony we have had
of the testamentary capacity of the testator, we have the charge that
Dr. A. who attended him for some years before his death was a 'quack'
and, therefore, his testimony is not to be believed. Now, so far as I am
concerned myself, I don't know what the counsel on the other side mean
by the word 'quack.' Dr. A. was a regular graduate of a reputable
school of medicine; he attended the testator to the latter's entire satisfaction; he done him good; he eased him in his last sickness; he made
him comfortable, and everything' else that a reputable physician could
do, Dr. A. did. But, gentlemen, let's see how frank and ingenuous this
charge made by these Stanford lawyers against Dr. A. is. We have this
especially emphasized by Mr. Welch, by Mr. Saufley and by my nephew,
Tom Hill. If I say anything about these gentlemen that is not true, I
challenge them right here and now in the presence of this jury to deny
it. Look at Bill Welch, a great big, bald-headed lawyer who has spent
$50 in the last year trying to get some sort of medicine that will make
the hair grow on his old bald head. And there's Mike Saufley. Gentlemen, I tell you right now, and I challenge him to deny it, Mike Saufley
is wearing a liver pad this minute and he joins in the cry that Dr. A.
was a 'quack;' and, gentlemen, there's my nephew, Tom Hill, baying
with the pack and joining in the charge that Dr. A. was a 'quack.'

IDEALS OF A LAwYEn
Gentlemen, I want to read you a little scrap of paper that has come Into
my possession. It reads:
'Stanford, Ky.
'Proprietors of Dobbin's Sure Cure.
Gentlemen:
It gives me pleasure to state that I have tried your remedy on my
wife and I find it all that you recommend.
(Signed) T. P. HilL'
"And Tom jines in the charge that Dr. A. was a 'quack.'"

(9) Perfect frankness on the part of a lawyer with the
court is an imperative duty. No lawyer has a right to assert his
own opinion as to fact or law either to court, jury or commissioner. The evidence, the written memorials of the law and
facts of which the courts and triers of facts take judicial notice,
speak for themselves. It is the grossest impropriety on the
part of counsel to undertake to mislead the court, by reading
from the law books in such a fragmentary way as to misrepresent either the opinion or the text-writer. I saw this thing
occur in an argument of a case in the Court of Appeals once.
Quite a distinguished lawyer, an ex-Chief Justice of the
Court of Appeals, was arguing the ease in the Court of Appeals and he had numerous books supposed to support his contention, and he said substantially to the court: "I am not going
to take Your Honors' time by reading all the authorities which
I have before you. I will select one as fairly representing the
He then read from the
bulk of those I have before me."
Supreme Court of Wisconsin a case which to all seeming supported his contention exactly. He then sat down with a smile of
triumph and gave place to his adversary, who as it happened,
had the last argument. This adversary said substantially: "If
the authorities which Judge X has paraded and not read bore
any relationship to the one which he has read, I am not surprised that he should have passed them over silently. My
brother must have known that the case which he had read Your
Honors from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was subsequently
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of
error and reversed as to the very point upon which he has cited
it as authority."
Let me illustrate this further: There is a federal statute
which requires the Comptroller of the Currency to report his

KENTUCKY

Lw

JOURNATJ

own opinions for the benefit of the accounting officers of the
treasury. When Judge Lawrence, of Ohio, occupied that distinguished position, he was arguing a case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, in which he had occasion to refer
to one of his own opinions. He did it with more or less of a
mumbled reference to book and page, and one of the justices
of the Supreme Court of the old school, leaned down and said:
"Excuse me, brother Lawrence, I didn't catch your last citation." Judge Lawrence said it might be found in 2nd Lawrence, page 484. The justice who asked the question settled
himself in his seat and exclaimed in a stage whisper: "Well,
I'll be damned."
(10) The judge on the bench owes the lawyers who are
practicing at his bar the same courtesy and consideration as it
is the duty of the lawyers to extend to the court. I have no
patience with that practice which obtains of a certain obsequiousness on the part of lawyers towards the bench. The
judge on the bench, of course, as an executive officer has to
manage the business in his court, but he has no right to be discourteous to counsel, or to assume a superiority which rarely
exists in any given case, though, of course, it is a part of his
executive function to keep lawyers within a reasonable time
for argument and within a courteous demeanor towards the
court, without, howe er, any attempted witticism or story, assuming to himself the superiority of a teacher to a pupil. I
do not forget one of the great English chancellors, Lord Lyndhurst, I think it was, who once said after he had been unduly
severe upon a practitioner before him: "It is the duty of a good
judge to prevent the lawyer from talking nonsense."
Another instance will illustrate this canon:
Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of the United States,
who started his career in Barbourville as a country doctor, left
that profession and entered the profession of law. He moved
to Iowa and was subsequently appointed Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and was a distinguished ornament
to that great tribunal. He had unfortunately, however, a
tyrannical habit on the bench. On one occasion while trying a
case in Kansas City, a young lawyer who had acquired legal
attainment in Harvard, and who was more of a lawyer of elementary principles than of court practice, was proceeding some-
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what unsatisfactorily to himself and much more so to Judge
Miller. Finally the judge lost all patience and he said:
"You had better sit down; you don't know anything about
your case." The young lawyer, with courage rarely possessed
by men of his experience, stopped and said: "May it please
Your Honor, my time has been mostly passed in acquiring
the elementary principles of the law, and I am sorry to say
that I am not as familiar with the practice as I should be. I
would like to ask Your Honor a question. Would it be permissible for me to ask a question of practice?" The old judge
said very gruffly: "Yes, go ahead."
The young lawyer then
said: "If I had said to Your Honor what Your Honor said to me,
would it have been a contempt of court?" The point hit home,
and Judge Miller said: "You can proceed with your argument."
One other and I pass on. Mr. Wilson, of Elizabethtown, a
very shrewd practitioner of the old school, got over the line
one day and was fined by the court. He said to the court:
"Judge, may I ask you what that fine is for?"
"Yes, Mr.
Wilson; for contempt of court." He drew out $5.00 from his
pocket and laid it on the table and said: "I'll pay it; it's a
just debt."
(11) I have quoted heretofore in the oath this language:
"I will never reject from any consideration personal to myself the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre
or malice."
I do not think the consensus of opinion of the leaders of the
profession will agree that the lawyer is bound to take a case
under any circumstances or conditions, and so I venture to suggest that the right to decline to enter into a relationship of such
high and responsible character is an absolute right, with good
reason, or with no reason, and I venture to suggest this to you.
(12) No advocate in a trial or in anticipation of one,
should show familiarity with the members of the jury panel.
Addressing them by name on a trial, or pointing an argument
by personal allusions, is highly improper. Covert allusions of
maters known alone to a juror and an advocate are as improper
in the trial as they are illbred in the drawing-room.
(13) In conclusion, courts of justice are temples in which
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advocates thresh out in the presence of the judge the ultimate
facts to which the latter applies the law, and it is as immoral,
and, therefore, unethical to deceive a juror on the question of
fact, as it is to mislead the judge on the question of law.
(-14)
The extremely delicate and confidential relations between attorney and client have given rise to another canon of
professional ethics. It is this: No client, who has employed you
to represent him in his litigation, has a right to employ another
lawyer without your consent to take your place, or even to
assist you in representing him to do what he has employed
you to do. Any lawyer who accepts such employment, without
your consent, is violating the rules of professional ethics, which
leaves you no reasonable alternative but to withdraw from the
case.
And in conclusion, let me say it has not been my purpose
to be exhaustive or definitive in these suggestions, which I have
made upon the subject of the ethics of the profession. If I
have said enough to make you think out these problems for your
self, I will have accomplished my purpose.
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